In this paper we present a statistical analysis of the factors that drive 
Introduction
There is a long history of research on the factors that drive changes in public opinion over time. This research is mainly focussed on party or candidate popularity, as surveyed in Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) . Historically, the main focus of attention has been the impact of economic performance on popularity. However, other dimensions of policy -and in particular after 9/11, security issues -have recently attracted researchers' attention (Gross et al., 2004) . However, we know little about the way in which public opinion about security issues evolves over time. For example, we do not know how volatile opinion is, or how sensitive it is to specific violent events.
In this paper we present evidence on opinions about security issues in Israel, a country where these issues dominate all others. Public opinion about the appropriate response to the enduring conflict with the Palestinians is well documented, as are the different aspects of the daily violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories since the start of the second Intifada in October 2000. These data are the basis for a time-series analysis that shows how sensitive Israeli opinion is to different aspects of the conflict, how quickly opinion responds to shortrun variations in conflict intensity, and how much opinion is likely to change in the event of a cessation of violence. We will also look at the extent to which economic conditions color attitudes toward the conflict. Opinions about security policy have been a key factor in the outcome of Israeli general elections (Shamir and Arian, 1999) and in the ability of Israeli governments to pursue a dialogue with their Palestinian counterparts (Mor, 1997; Shamir and Shikaki, 2002) . We will see that escalation (or de-escalation) of specific elements of the conflict can have an immediate and substantial impact on opinion, but that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the way in which opinion responds to these different elements.
The Formation of Public Opinion: Conceptual Background

Public opinion formation and rationality
For many years academics were dismissive of the ability of the general public in matters relating to international relations and international negotiations. Public opinion was thought to be characterised by a lack of interest, information and intellect (Knopf, 1998) . This traditional view, known widely as the Almond-Lippmann consensus, proposed the existence of an unstable public opinion largely ignored by elites. However, a number of recent studies (Belanger and Petry, 2005; Holsti, 1992; Isernia et al., 2002; Knopf, 1998; Shapiro and Page, 1988) have found evidence for a certain amount of stability in the preferences revealed by surveys of public opinion, which appears to move rationally and consistently with external events. Even if information is complex and hard to attain, people may use cognitive short-cuts and heuristics to formulate internally consistent opinions. Unstable opinions may just reflect an unstable foreign environment (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992) . In this case, the evolution of Israeli opinions about negotiations within the Palestinians will have a predictable component that can be described by a statistical model.
Previous work on public opinion within Israel has tended to focus on cross-sectional data, and attention has been devoted to correlations of individuals' opinions at a given point in time with their socio-demographic characteristics. Cross-sectional analysis has shown that ethnicity, education, religiosity and political orientation all have a significant affect on attitudes, while the level of religious piety, gender and age have little or no effect Shamir and Shikaki, 2002; Nachtwey and Tessler, 1998) . The results of these papers are consistent with a rational choice framework in which systematic variation in individuals' characteristics correlates with variation in their preferred public policy. One paper dealing specifically with attitudes towards the peace process is Al-Haj et al. (1993) . This paper analyses Israeli expectations about the consequences of the formation of a Palestinian state for personal security, the economy and the social situation. Only 18 per cent of Jewish Israelis expect their personal safety to improve with a Palestinian state.
Nevertheless, there is a strong correlation between these expectations and the level of support for negotiations; economic factors also appear to have some effect.
However, we wish to focus on the factors driving the evolution of opinions over time, rather than on their cross-sectional variation. Very little work has been done in this area. Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar (2002) introduce a time dimension to the study of Israeli public opinion, using a longitudinal survey. The authors make use of a peace index conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, which will also be used in this paper. They find a substantial degree of stability and consistency in Israeli public opinion -more than in American and European opinion -toward a negotiated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their results suggest a society with well-anchored opinions that react coherently to prevailing conditions. There is a marked difference of opinion between the secular left and the religious right, but both groups' preferences evolve in a similar fashion over time. We can therefore model the dynamics of opinion formation in aggregate without risking any serious aggregation bias in the parameters of our statistical model. While Hermann and YuchtmanYaar acknowledge the importance of understanding the dynamics of public opinion, they do not analyse the causes of changes in opinion. Our paper fills this gap, focusing on the security and economic considerations that Al-Haj et al. (1993) have shown to be important.
Factors driving the evolution of public opinion
The evolution of public opinion towards negotiation is likely to be driven by a number of factors. These include firstly, factors that contribute to change in the perceived level of personal and national security; secondly, factors affecting the intensity of a sense of grievance against the Palestinians (or the degree of sympathy for their plight); and thirdly, factors affecting perceptions about the magnitude of the social and economic cost of refraining from negotiation. Of course, individual events may impact on public opinion through more than one of these channels. There follows a short discussion of each channel; we deal with measurement issues in Section 3.
(i) Security
For Israelis considering the possibility of negotiations, particularly those relating to territorial claims and the right of return for Palestinian refugees, "national threat perceptions are existential" (Alpher, 1994) , and Israeli society embodies a value system with security concerns at the forefront (Bar-Tal, 1998). Israel's international security situation is gradually changing: the Arab world is no longer monolithic in its opposition to the State of Israel, and more Arab countries are gradually extending diplomatic relations to the Jewish state. Nevertheless, Israel continues to exist in a hostile environment and the threat to security remains important in the collective memory. Consequently, many Israelis still seem to consider the potential costs related to a peace process to be prohibitively high.
Qualitative evidence on the perceived importance of different elements of national security is presented in Rouhana and Fiske (1995) . For Jewish interviewees (none of whom were resident in the West Bank or Gaza), the main factor evoking a sense of threat is "attacks and acts of sabotage" in Israel. Other important factors determining the perceived sense of security include the intensity of the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG), and American policy towards Israel. It is in theory possible that an increased sense of insecurity resulting from violence targeted at Israelis will persuade more of them to support the peace process, as a way to improve security. However, the 2001 election victory of Ariel Sharon over Ehud Barak on a relatively hawkish ticket, following the commencement of the (Ludvigsen, 2005) that variations in the popularity of successive Israeli governments are correlated with economic factors (particularly inflation), but also with Israeli casualties. It is therefore possible that variations in economic performance will impact on support for the peace process, through its impact on support for the government. Indeed, there is already cross-sectional survey evidence (Nachtwey and Tessler, 1998 ) that general confidence in the government is associated with stronger support for the peace process. The same paper shows that those satisfied with their economic position are more likely to favour the peace process.
(ii) Grievance and sympathy
The discussion of security issues supposes a rationale for support for (or opposition to) the peace process that is based on entirely pragmatic, utilitarian arguments. This does not imply that attitudes are entirely independent of views about the "fairness" of more or less conciliatory policies towards the Palestinians. Some Israelis might support a tit-for-tat strategy by the government -responding to Palestinian attacks by pursuing a less conciliatory policy -as a result of dispassionate game-theoretic arguments. However, such a strategy might equally be supported by those for whom Palestinian attacks violate inherited fairness norms. Different types of conflict event might be associated with differing degrees of outrage.
On the other hand, support for the peace process could increase after conflict events in which some or all of the Palestinian casualties are perceived by some Israelis to be innocent victims, again because fairness norms have been violated.
(iii) Cost
Interwoven with security concerns about the conflict are the direct social and economic costs.
In Israel, these include not only death and injury suffered in Palestinian militant attacks, but also the substantial amount of time devoted to military service by large numbers of Israeli reservists, the psychological effects of military service on soldiers and their families, and the consequences for trade and international relations of negative international public opinion among those sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Riots, demonstrations and violence in WBG entail a substantial cost for Israelis, even in the absence of suicide bomb attacks in Israeli cities. There is also a growing literature that identifies specific economic costs relating to the conflict. The conflict impacts on tourism (Fleischer and Buccola, 2002) , savings (Fielding 2003a; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004) , investment (Fielding, 2003b) and the stock market (Eldor and Melnick, 2004 Nachtwey and Tessler (2002) find a high correlation between the belief that peace will be of economic benefit and support for reconciliation with the Palestinians.
Evidence from other parts of the world suggests that public support for military action is sensitive to the magnitude of war casualties (Mueller, 1973; Gartner and Segura, 2000) , and that people's commitment to a conflict is proportional to the psychological toll it exerts on them (Nancic and Nancic, 1995) , although the link between costs and opinion may be weaker when national survival is threatened (Gartner and Segura, 1998) . Such factors may play some role in the formation of public opinion in Israel. Moreover, past research has shown that the impact of conflict intensity on support for military action depends on the temporal and geographical proximity of casualties, so sensitivity to a particular death can vary regionally within a country (Gartner et al., 1997) . In the case of Israel, casualties in WBG may have a different effect on the perceived cost of the conflict than casualties in Israeli cities.
Measurement of Israeli Opinion and its Correlates
In this section we discuss how we quantify Israeli support for the peace process, and also how we measure the factors likely to drive changes in the degree of support. Section 4 then presents the statistical model based on these measures.
Measurement of Israeli opinion
Since June 1994 the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research has undertaken a monthly survey of opinions on a range of issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 2005) . 3 The survey is the basis of a monthly "Oslo Peace Index", which is a composite of responses to the following two questions:
What is your opinion on the agreement that was signed in Oslo between Israel and the PLO (Agreement of Principles)?
Do you believe or not believe that the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO will bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years?
These questions provide a direct insight into people's opinions with regard to reconciliation.
The index is normalised so that it ranges from 0-100 ( The two questions in the survey concern slightly different aspects of public attitudes towards the peace process. Information from the surveys, where the percentages of positive responses to each question are reported separately, shows that the mean score for the second question is substantially lower than the mean score for the first. While some Israelis support the idea of a negotiated settlement, belief in its occurrence does not match this support.
However, the correlation between the responses to the two questions is consistently high ).
The two specific elements of public opinion that are addressed in the index are belief in the feasibility of the peace process and support for the process. Inevitably (and in line with the correlations provided in Al-Haj et al., 1993) , the two opinions are inextricably related. If there is a belief that the process can create peace, then support for the process increases.
Our statistical model seeks to explain variations in the Peace Index that are related to the changing economic and political environment. As discussed above, variations in the intensity of different dimensions of the conflict might affect Israeli opinion for a number of reasons. Some events might evoke a greater sense of insecurity among some Israelis, or a sense of grievance against Palestinians; this will tend to reduce support for the peace process.
Others events might evoke sympathy for Palestinians among some Israelis, or a perception that the persistent social and economic costs of the Intifada justify more negotiations; this will tend to increase support for the peace process. The economic environment may also be Substitution of data from other sources (for example, the IDF) makes no substantial difference to our results. We will be using data on actual casualty figures, rather than figures reported in certain media outlets. While international reactions to the conflict might depend on how it is reported in the international media, Israelis themselves are much more likely to be aware -or to have the opportunity to be aware -of what is actually happening. We expect this series to be negatively correlated with the Peace Index, as it represents a direct security threat and a cause of grievance that makes Israelis less willing to negotiate. Although it is possible to disaggregate Israeli civilian fatalities by various demographic characteristicsfor example, by age -we do not use any such disaggregation in our statistical model. The identity of those killed by a particular suicide bomb is largely a matter of chance, and unlikely to have much impact on the average Israeli's sense of grievance.
As can be seen in (
ii) IDF personnel killed by Palestinians (S)
This measure includes IDF personnel killed in all locations. It could impact on Israelis' sense of personal security and grievance, because so many serve (or have relatives who serve) as reservists. In this regard, its effect is likely to be similar to that of Israeli civilian casualties. It is even possible that the deaths of large numbers of IDF personnel fuel security concerns even more than suicide bomb attacks. For these reasons, we would expect a negative correlation between the Peace Index and IDF fatalities. On the other hand, high military casualties may affect perceptions about the ability of the IDF to control proceedings, and hence the likely cost of the conflict. It is possible that this mitigates the negative correlation. The total number of IDF personnel killed in the sample period is 295.
(iii) Jewish Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians in WBG (IT)
It is possible that casualties in Jewish settlements in WBG (a total of 210 in our sample period) impact on the Peace Index differently from other civilian casualties. Some Israelis may have less sympathy for the occupants of the settlements than they do for their other compatriots, so that casualties on the other side of the Green Line evoke less of a sense of grievance. For Israelis who never cross the Green Line, there is also likely to be much less of a personal security threat. Moreover, fighting around the settlements is likely to remind some
Israelis of the cost of retaining territory in the WBG. For these reasons, we have no a priori prediction of the sign of the effect of this variable on the Peace Index.
(iv) Palestinian adults killed by the IDF in WBG (PA)
Palestinian deaths in WBG provide an indicator of the intensity of the uprising. For a given level of Israeli casualties, variations in Palestinian casualties may impact on the perceived cost of retaining territory in WBG. An increase in Palestinian casualties may also evoke a sense of sympathy for Palestinians, although this is less likely for adult deaths than it is for child deaths, if there is a perception that the majority of adults are combatants and the majority of children are non-combatants. These factors suggest a positive impact on the Peace Index. However, an increase in the magnitude of the uprising may intensify the perception of a security threat felt by Israelis, which will tend to mitigate any positive correlation. The total number of adult Palestinian deaths in the sample period is 2,419.
(v) Palestinian children killed by the IDF in WBG (PM)
The same comments apply here as in the case of Palestinian adult deaths, except that some Israelis may have more sympathy for child deaths, so a larger positive correlation with the Peace Index is possible. There are 605 Palestinian child deaths in the sample period.
(vi) Injuries in WBG (INJ)
This is an alternative measure of the intensity of the uprising. Statistics on a monthly basis. We make use of one main indicator: the monthly inflation rate (INF). We also have data on Israeli unemployment (U); however, it is not obvious that Israeli unemployment data are reported consistently over the whole sample period. 9 Results of statistical analysis using unemployment data are discussed in the next section, but the main results incorporate inflation as the key monthly macroeconomic indicator.
The correlates of aggregate attitudes: significant events
The Peace Index might respond to specific national and international events. The impact of such an event can be captured by adding to our regression equation a dummy variable for the month in which the event occurred. We limited our attention to a number of key events;
otherwise, the risk of data-mining is very high. The following events were considered.
(i) The 9/11 attacks in America (2001m9)
The general consensus within Israel was that the 9/11 attacks would have a favourable impact on the peace process (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann, 2001) . Following the attacks, there was an increase in international interest in the politics and conflicts in the Middle East. Many
Israelis and Americans drew parallels between the 9/11 attacks and suicide bomb attacks in Israel, which could create a perception that Israel would receive more support from America than otherwise in any negotiations with the Palestinians. In this case, there would be a positive coefficient on this dummy.
(ii) Operation Defensive Shield (2002m4)
This was a very large offensive by the IDF intended to destroy paramilitary networks thought to exist in Palestinian Authority controlled areas. This followed the peak in suicide bomb attacks noted above. The Israeli public in general felt that the operation increased Israel's security, but that it may have harmed the peace process (Yuchtman-Yaar and . In this case, there would be a negative coefficient on this dummy.
(iii) The commencement of the war in Iraq (2003m3)
The Iraq war was expected to change the political situation in the Middle East. Israelis appeared to view the American victory in Iraq as a positive step towards a solution to their local conflict (Yuchtman-Yaar & Hermann, 2003) . In this case, there would be a positive coefficient on this dummy.
(iv) American diplomatic intervention (2004m4)
In April 2004, President Bush wrote a letter of support for the Israeli government's planned withdrawal from the Gaza strip, and offered support for the maintenance of other settlements in the West Bank. In the same month, the plan for the withdrawal from Gaza was defeated in an internal vote in the ruling Likud Party. This dummy reflects both a statement of American support for Israel, favouring the peace process, and internal divisions in the Government, a destabilizing influence that might militate against the peace process.
(v) The Rafah operation (2004m5)
May 2004 saw a major demolition of houses in Rafah (in the Gaza strip) by the IDF, part of a government-approved plan to expand the buffer zone in the area. The action was controversial abroad, but also within Israel, since it represented a step towards a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Given the divisions among Israelis about these plans, we have no priors about the sign on the coefficient on this dummy.
Only the final two event dummies (for 2004m4-5) were ever statistically significant in any regression specification. The tables below report regressions incorporating just these two;
further details are available on request. 
Modelling the Peace Index
The β i (L) are lag polynominal operators:
. The α i are scalar parameters and u t is an error term. The unrestricted model is fitted with a lag order (R) equal to two; this equation is reported on the left hand side of Table 4 . At least one lag of each variable has a β coefficient significantly different from zero.
11 However, many individual lags are statistically insignificant, which suggests that the model is over-parameterized, and that restricting its dynamics will lead to a more efficient estimate. For this reason we report a restricted version of the regression on the right hand side of Table 4 . Here, some statistically insignificant coefficients have been set to zero. The choice of restrictions is based on the PcGets algorithm (Hendry and Krolzig, 2004) ; further details are available on request. The diagnostic test statistics for the restricted model reported in Table 5 and the recursive estimates of its parameters illustrated in Figure 4 suggest that the model is robust. 12 The simulations discussed below are based on the restricted model.
Individual parameters in the dynamic model are not in themselves very informative.
We interpret the model first of all by computing the steady-state coefficients implicit in Table   11 IT is an exception. However, the lags of this variable are jointly significant at the 5% level. 12 The recursive estimates in Table 6 shows that both Israeli civilian fatalities outside WBG (I) and IDF casualties (S) are associated with weakened support for the Peace Process. The effect of IDF casualties appears to be the larger of the two. A permanent 1% increase in IDF casualties is predicted to reduce support for the peace process by around 0.12%; a similar increase in civilian casualties is predicted to reduce support for the peace process by around 0.03%. The explanation for these effects is likely to lie partly in their impact on perceived Israeli insecurity, and partly on the sense of grievance that they create. The fact that the IDF casualty effect is so much larger suggests that insecurity effects are more important than grievance effects here. It is difficult to see how military casualties could create more of a sense of grievance than civilian ones. higher than we might otherwise expect: 0.25 -0.12 = 0.13. One explanation for this is that at extremely high civilian casualty levels the normal negative impact on the Peace index is reversed. However, we should be cautious when constructing a behavioral interpretation of a coefficient on a dummy variable, which might be capturing some other random variation in the value of the index for that month. The negative coefficients on M1 and M2 indicate that support for the Peace Process was particularly low during April-May 2004, the period of the Rafah vote and the Gaza demolitions. Table 6 does not provide any information on the dynamics of the fitted model. Figures 5-7 fill this gap by illustrating hypothetical responses of the Peace Index to temporary changes in each of the explanatory variables. In constructing these figures, we have assumed in each case that all other variables are held constant, 13 and that there is a unit increase in our variable of interest for single period, after which it returns to its initial level. The lines plot the response of the log of the Peace Index over the next 12 months. 14 As we might expect from Table 6 , the largest effect is for a change in the number of IDF fatalities. However, all of the 13 The figures summarize the dynamics of the model; they are not designed to illustrate the impact of "typical" shocks to the explanatory variables, which are not quite orthogonal. 14 It can be seen from the figures that there is some oscillation in the response of the Peace Index in each case. This is a consequence of the negative coefficient on lagged ln(J) in Table 4 , which is marginally significant in the unrestricted version of the model. There is no obvious explanation for this effect. Suppressing the lagged ln(J) coefficient removes the oscillation without changing the overall response patterns.
response profiles share a common feature: the bulk of the effect of a temporary change in a fatality variable, or in the rate of inflation, is dissipated within the next four months.
Deviations of the Peace Index from its mean are short-lived, and a temporary change in any one dimension of the conflict is soon forgotten. Events of three or four months ago will have virtually no impact at all on the Peace Index today.
These results beg a final question: how much support would there be for the Peace Process in the absence of violent conflict? We can answer this question by using the fitted model in Table 4 to simulate a hypothetical Peace Index for 2000-2004 with one or all of the conflict variables set to zero over this period. Figures 8-9 depict such simulations, and Table 7 reports some of the corresponding descriptive statistics. These numbers should be treated with a certain amount of caution. A complete cessation of violence has never actually been realised for any length of time, and our model assumes that the different factors influencing opinion are additively separable. 15 Nevertheless, our results strongly indicate that in the complete absence of any sign of unrest in WBG, the vast majority of Israelis would be uninterested in the idea of peaceful negotiations with the Palestinians.
Summary and Conclusion
The One striking result of the statistical analysis is the speed with which opinions respond to conflict events and economic conditions. The current level of the Peace Index depends largely on what has happened in the last three or four months. Conflict events and economic conditions more than four months old have little impact on the current value of the index.
Significant events, such as a large suicide bomb attack, have a substantial immediate impact on opinion, but after a few months their impact on opinion appears to be largely dissipated.
With some caution, we can forecast the impact on support for the Peace Process of a cessation of violence. With an end to fatal attacks on Israeli security force personnel and on civilians west of the Green Line, support may just about rise to 50%. As long as the attacks continue, a majority of Israelis are likely to remain opposed to the Peace Process, at least in its Oslo incarnation. By contrast, lowering civilian casualties east of the Green Line is likely to reduce support for the Peace Process. In the absence of any trouble, the majority of Israelis are likely to give low priority to negotiations with the Palestinians. Successful international intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to require an awareness of the incentives that these effects create for Israeli and Palestinian leaders. 
